Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? Evidence from the Tax Returns of U.S. Multinationals by Rosanne Altshuler et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DO REPATRIATION TAXES MA1TER?





Working Paper No. 4.667




Prepared for the 1994 NEER Conference on International Taxation. We are very grateful to
Gordon Wilson for his assistance in using the Treasury tax data. We thank Bill Gentry and
other conference participants for valuable comments. We also thank seminar participants at
the University of Pennsylvania. the University of Toronto, and the 1993 NBER Summer
Institute for helpful comments. Any views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Treasury Department or the National
Bureau of Economic Research. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Public
Economics.NBER Working Paper #4667
March 1994
DO REPATRIATION TAXES MATFER?
EVIDENCE FROM THE TAX RETURNS
OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS
ABSTRACT
An open questionin theliterature on the taxation of multinational corporations is whether
repathation taxes influence whether the profits of foreign subsidiaries are repatriated or reinvested
abroad. Theoretical models suggest that dividend remittances should not be influenced by
repatriation taxes. The results of recent empirical work indicate that dividend remittances are
sensitive to repathation taxes. This paper investigates whether the empirical evidence can be
reconciled with the theoretical results by recognizing that repatriation taxes on dividends may
vary over time and provide firms with an incentive to time repatriations so that they occur in
years when repatriation tax rates are relatively low. We use information about cross-country
differences in tax rates to separately estimate the influence of permanent tax changes, as would
occur due to changes in statutory tax rates, and transitory tax changes on dividend repatriations.
Our data contains U.S. tax return information for a large sample of U.S. corporations and their
foreign subsidiaries. We fmd that the permanent tax price effect is significantly different from
the transitory price effect and is not significantly different from zero, while the transitory tax
price effect is negative and significant. This suggests that repatriation taxes do affect dividend
repatriation behavior but only to the extent that they vary over time. Previous empirical work
has apparently measured the effect of timing behavior.
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Washington. D.C. 20220An open question in the literature on the taxation of multinational corporations is whether
taxes due on repatriation of foreign source income influence whether the profits of foreign
subsidiaries are repatriated or reinvested abroad. Theoretical arguments by Hartman (1985)
suggest that dividend payments by foreign subsidiaries should not be influenced by such
repatriation taxes. Under this view, which is analogous to the "new view" of dividend taxation
applied to domestic firms, taxes due upon repatriation are unavoidable costs for "mature" foreign
subsidiaries that finance investment out of retained earnings.' As a result, investment and
dividend payment decisions are unaffected by those taxes. The results of recent empirical work
that used cross-sectional data on U.S.multinationalsseem to contradict Hartman's theoretical
result. These studies indicate that dividend remittances are sensitive to repatriation taxes. This
presents a puzzle.
Hartman's analysis (and the "new view" of dividend taxation) is based on the assumption
that taxes on dividends are constant over time. This paper investigates whether the empirical
evidence can be reconciled with the theoretical results by recognizing that repatriation taxes on
dividends may vary over time. This variability may provide firms with an incentive to repatriate
relatively more profits from a subsidiary when the tax cost of doing so is temporarily relatively
lower than normal, and to retain more profits when the tax cost of repatriation is higher than
normal.2 Such timing behavior could be revealed in cross-sectional data by a relationship
between dividend payout levels and the current level of the tax cost of dividend payments, when
the actual relationship is between dividend payout levels and the current level of the tax cost
relative to its normal level. If timing opportunities are important to dividend payout decisions,
then it becomes difficult to interpret the tax effects estimated in previous papers. In particular,these estimates will tend to confuse the effects of permanent tax changes, as would occur due
to changes in statutory tax rates, withthe effects oftax changes due to transitory changes in the
situation of the taxpayer.
It isimportant todistinguish whether cross-sectional differences between subsidiaries in
dividendpayout behavior are duetothe current level of the taxcostof paying dividends or the
difference betweenthe current and the normal,or expectedfuture,taxcost. Makingthis
distinction will help us evaluate the effects of tax policy on the location of investment, the form
of finance, and tax revenues. More specifically, it has implications for the evaluation of policies
such as the reduction of withholding tax rates in bilateral tax treaties and the repeal of the
deferred taxation that foreign profits generally enjoy in the United States. The policy
implications of this work are discussed in more detail in the final section of the paper.
Micro data can be used to distinguish the effects of transitory variation in tax costs from
the effects of permanent differences in tax costs. This paper uses a recently created data set
containing U.S.taxreturn information for a large sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign
subsidiaries. For some of our empirical work, we link the subsidiary-specific data across time
to create a panel data set. To our knowledge, this is the largest panel data set in existence.that
contains tax information on multinationals. It is also the only panel data set that has detailed tax
information on both the parent corporations and their foreign subsidiaries.
2We use information about cross-country differences in tax rates to estimate separate
effects for the permanent and transitory components of the tax price of dividend repatriation.
The idea is that variations across countries in average repatriation tax prices or in statutory tax
rateswill be correlated with the permanentcomponent of taxpricevariation, but uncorrelated
with transitory variations. Using these measures to construct instrumental variables for the tax
price allows us to separately identify permanent and transitory tax price effects. Our estimation
strategy is similar to that of Burman and Randolph (1993), who used state tax rates as
instruments to separate permanent from transitory effects of taxes on capital gains realizations.
To preview our results, we find that the permanent tax price effect is significantly
different from the transitory price effect and is not significantly different from zero, while the
transitory tax price effect is negative and significant. This suggests that previous cross-sectipnal
analysis has measured the effect of timing behavior, either through tax planning that affects both
the tax price and dividend payments or through companies timing their repatriations to take
advantage of exogenous transitory variations in tax prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews Hartman's
analysis, the related empirical literature, and some more recent theoretical work in this area.
Section U derives the tax price of a dividend repatriation, Section III presents the empirical
model, and Section IV describes the data. Results are presented in Section V, followed by
concluding remarks.
31. The Hartinan Analysis and Subsequent Studies
TheUnitedStates system for taxing the income earned by the foreignsubsidiariesof U.S.
corporationsdefers taxation of foreign income until it is brought back to the United States and
provides a credit for foreign taxes paid.' Underthiscredit and deferral system, the two main
forms of repatriation tax that a firm incurs on income remitted from a foreign subsidiary are the
residual home country tax liability (if any) not offset by the foreign tax credit, and any
withholding tax imposed by the sourée country. Hartman (1985) argued that, under a credit and
deferral tax system, the repatriation tax on foreign source income is irrelevant to the investment
and dividend payment decisions of foreign subsidiaries that are financed through retained
earnings ('mature" subsidiaries). Hartman's insight was that, since the repatriation tax is
unavoidable, it reduces the opportunity cost of investment and the return to investment by the
same amount. As a result, the tax does not affect a mature subsidiary's choice between
reinvesting its foreign earnings and repatriating funds to its parent.4 His analysis is essentially
an application of the "new view" or "tax capitalization view" of dividend taxation put forward
by King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981). The "new view" holds that taxes on
dividends (if constant over time) have no distortionary effects on the real decisions of domestic
corporations. Although Hartinan's analysis pertains to the residual U.S. tax on foreign income,
it applies equally well to withholding taxes.
Several empirical studies using cross-sections of tax return data appear to contradict
Hartman's theoretical result. Mutti (1981) used U.S. tax return data from 1972 to estimate the
effect of tax costs on the choice of income remittance channels. He found significant tax effects
4in estimates of the parameters of a dividendequation.Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) and Hines
and Hubbard (1990) both used 1984 tax return data of large samples of U.S. corporations and
their foreign subsidiaries to investigate tax effects on foreign income remittances. Goodspeed
and Frisch matched data on parent corporations with country-specific information on their
foreign subsidiaries in an attempt to quantify income repatriation incentives created by the U.S.
tax system. By further disaggregating the 1984 tax return data, Hines and Hubbard were able
to study income repatriation behavior using a data set that matched subsidiary-specific
information to parent corporation data. Both studies found significant evidence of tax effects
on income repatriation. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) used U.S. tax return data from 1986 to
investigate tax effects on dividend remittances from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parent
corporations.This paper improved upon previous work by providing a more accurate
specification of the tax incentives facing firms. Results from estimates of dividend equations
indicated a somewhat larger and more significant tax effect than had been previously estimated.
Recognizing that Hartman's theoretical analysis did not allow repatriation taxes to vary
over time may help to reconcile it with the empirical results from the above studies. There are
at least two different ways in which the repatriation tax may vary. First, it may vary over time
due to differences between the tax base definitions of the United States and the host country of
the foreign subsidiary. The U.S. foreign tax credit is based on the average foreign tax rate of
the subsidiary, where the avenge is calculated with respect to the U.S. definition of the tax
base. Differences in tax base definitions may vary over time, e.g., if capital cost allowances
differ, causing the average foreign tax rate as defined by the United States to vary. This
5variation in the avengeforeign taxratecauses theforeign tax creditallowed fora given
dividendpayment to vary over time as well. Such variations in the avengeforeign taxrate may
be planned. For example, to the extent that the timing of deductions and credits is discretionary,
a foreign subsidiary may shift them from years in which it is remitting income to years in which
it is not remitting income, thereby maximizing the foreign tax credit. This device is known as
the "rhythm method" in the tax planning jargon.5
The second cause of variation in the repatriation tax is movement by the parent company
between being in "excess credit," i.e., having more foreign tax credits available than are needed
to offset potential U.S.taxliability on foreign source income, and being in "excess limitation,"
the opposite condition. Since the U.S.foreigntax credit operates, to some extent, on an overall
basis, excess foreign tax credits generated from one source of foreign income can be used to
offset potential U.S.taxon another source of foreign income that generates insufficient foreign
tax credits. If the parent corporation is in excess credit, there is no additional U.S. tax cost to
repatriating foreign income, If the parent is in excess limitation, then the U.S. tax cost of
repatriating income from a subsidiary may be positive or negative, depending on the avenge
foreign tax rate of the subsidiary.
Several recent theoretical contributions have incorporated a repatriation tax thatmay vary
over time and that may be endogenous to the investment and financial decisions of subsidiaries
and parent corporations. Hines (1989) shows that U.S. tax payments on foreign source income
are affected by differences in the way the U.S. and host countries determine taxable income.
6In his model, therepatriationtax isa function of the ratioof U.S. defined income to foreign
defined income. He points out that this ratio may vary over time and may be affected by
investment decisions. As a result, investment incentives may be influenced by the repatriation
tax. LeechorandMintz (1993) make a similar argument. In their model, the repatriation tax
is alsoendogenous andtheHartmanresultobtains only when host andhomecountrytaxbases,
adjusted for inflation, are proportionalto each other.
AltshulerandFuighieri(1990) offer a model in which parentcorporations may switch
intoand outof theexcess credit position. This model shows that the Hartman result obtains
onlywhen the excess credit positionis stationary. The insight here is that switching between
credit states breaks down the equivalence between the impact of repatriation taxesonthe
opportunity cost of capital and on the returns to investment.
In one sense, none of these recent theoretical contributions has departed from the
Hartman result: the level of the repatriation tax does not by itself affect the incentive to
repatriate incomerather thanreinvest it. Instead, it is the variation over time in the level of the
repatriation taxthat affectstheincentiveto repatriate income,becausethis variationprovides
parent corporations with theopportunityto time remittancessothat theyoccur inyearswhen
repatriation taxrates are relatively low.Ifthese theoretical predictions are correct, then failure
todistinguish betweentheeffects of permanent and transitory variation inthetax pricewhen
estimatingtax effectson repatriation offoreign income couldleadto incorrect results. The
7effect of permanent variation in the tax price might be overstated, since the estimates would
confoundthe effects of permanent and transitory variation in the tax price.
II.The Tax Price of Dividend Repatriations
In this section we specify a measure of the tax price of repatriating foreign income in the
form of dividends and we briefly discuss the factors that may cause that tax price to vary over
time.6 To understand how these tax prices are derived, some background information on the
foreign tax credit is useful. The discussion here borrows heavily from Altshuler and Newlon
(1993).
The foreign tax credit has two components. The first, called the direct credit, is a credit
for foreign taxes paid directly on income as it is received by a U.S. taxpayer. Foreign taxes
eligible for the direct credit include withholding taxes on remittances to the U.S. taxpayer such
as dividends, interest, and royalties, and also income taxes on foreign branch operations. The
second component, called the deemed-paid or indirect credit, is a credit for foreign income taxes
paid on the income out of which a dividend distribution is made to the U.S. taxpayer. The
deemed paid credit is generally a credit for foreign corporate income taxes.
The deemed paid credit for a dividend remittance from a foreign subsidiaiy is calculated
by grossing up the dividend to reflect the foreign tax deemed paid on that dividend income.7
To illustrate, suppose subsidiary i makes a dividend payment, D, to itsparent corporation. The
grossed up dividend is
8D1 4 TjDJ(YrTj) (1)
whereT denotes the total. foreign income tax paid by subsidiary i and Y1 denotes the subsidiary's
pre-tax income fromthe U.S. perspective,which is the subsidiary's book earnings and profits.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as D./(l-rj, where r1 represents the avenge subsidiary tax rate,
TjY, on foreign earnings from the U.S. perspective. The U.S. taxonthe dividend before
credits isrDj(1-rj, where r denotestheU.S. rate of tax. The United States considersthat
creditable foreign tax was paid on the dividend in the amount of ;D./(1-r). The U.S. tax
liabilityonthedividend payment afterthedeemed-paid credit istherefore D,fr-r)/(l-r1).
Theamount of foreign taxcredit that canactually be usedislimited,however, tgthe
amountof U.S. tax payableonforeign income. Therefore, if the foreign tax rate, ;, exceeds
the U.S. tax rate, r, excesscredits are created inthe amountofD1(rr)/(1-r). If the foreign
tax rate is less than the U.S. tax rate, then a U.S. tax liability of D.,(r-r.JI(l-r)accrues andthe
remitted foreign income is said to be creating excess limitation.
As noted above, the Limitation on the foreign taxcredit operates tosome extent on an
overall basis. This means that excess credits accruing from one source of foreign income can
often be used to offset U.S. tax (excess limitation) on foreign incomefromanothersource.This
is called cross-crediting or averaging of foreign income. The ability to cross-credit means that
the effect of repatriating foreign income from a particular source may be positive, negative or
zero.'
9The Deñvation of Tax Pdces
Wedefine the tax priceofa dividend remittanceasthe additional global tax liability
arising from an incremental dollar's worth of dividend repatriations. To derive the tax price we
must take intoaccount boththe incremental U.S.andsource country taxes on a dollar of
dividends. The U.S.taxliability generated by dividend payments before the foreign tax credit
equals rDj(l-rJ.The foreign taxes creditableagainst U.S. tax liability are deemed-paid taxes
plus withholdingtaxes,or
rDj(l-r)+ w1D (2)
where w1 denotes the withholding tax rate in the host country. If the parent is in excess credit,
any U.S. tax liability on a dollar of dividends is offset by the foreign tax credit. If the parent
is in excess limitation, the U.S. tax liability equals
(r-rj)Dj(l-rj-co,D. (3)
To compute the global tax price of a dollar of dividends we add the source country effect
to the U.S. tax effect. Under a classical corporate income tax system9 the total source country
tax liability on subsidiary i equals
T1=;Y, + D1. (4)
As a result, the only host country tax consequences of a dividend remittance are the associated
withholding taxes. If the parent is in excess credits there is no U.S.taxconsequence and
therefore the global tax price is co. If the parent is in excess limitation the global tax price,p,
is
p=(r-rjI(l-r). (5)
10The withholding tax has no net effect on global taxes because the extra withholding tax paid on
the dividend remittance is offset by a reduction ofU.S. tax of an equal amount.Due to cross-
crediting,the global tax price may be negative and dividend payments may reduce the firm's
global tax liability.'0
Expression (5) shows that, if the parent corporation isin excesslimitation, then the tax
price of a dividend remittance is inversely related to the subsidiary's avenge tax rate, r. As
noted previously, to the extent that these variations in r are endogenous, e.g. because the timing
of deductions and credits is elective, they can become a part of tax planning strategies for
repatriating foreign source income. Even if a subsidiary's avenge tax rate is relatively constant,
the tax price of remittances will fluctuate significantly when the subsidiary's parent switches
credit position. Consider a subsidiary with an average tax rate above the U.S.corporaterate.
When the parent is in excess limitation, the tax price of a dividend remittance is negative [(r-
ra/(l-rt) < 0]. When the parent is in excess credit, the tax price equals the withholding tax
rate. As a result, tax prices for some subsidiaries can be negative in some years and positive
in others. These changes in tax prices may also be endogenous if parents can control their
foreign tax credit positions through careful structuring of remittances from foreign subsidiaries.
The next section presents an estimation strategy to separate the effect of these transitory
components of tax prices from the effect of changes in the permanent component.
11m. AnEmpirical Model of Dividend Repatriations
Previous work by Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993). has
estimated a simple empirical model of dividend repatriations. For subsidiaries paying a dividend
the model takes the following basic form:
d=a0+a,P+br+XA+€, (6)
where d is the dividend payout, expressed as the ratio of subsidiary dividends to assets, P is the
current tax price of dividend repatriation", r is the after-tax rate of return for the subsidiary,
and X is a vector of characteristics of subsidiary and parent. Equation (6) is not derived
explicitly from the firm's optimization problem, but can be considered a reduced form suitable
for testing the general implications of theoretical models such as Nartman's. It is similar to the
empirical models used to explain dividend payments in a purely domestic context.
In these previous papers, P was expected to have a negative coefficient since higher tax
prices were expected to reduce the attractiveness of repatriation. The after-tax rate of return,
r, may have an ambiguous effect on the dividend payout. On the one hand, if dividend
payments are a residual, then higher earnings, which would increase the measured rate of return,
could be expected cewrispurl/na toincrease the dividend payout. On the other hand, a higher
after-tax rate of return would increase desired investment, having the effect of increasing
retained earnings and reducing the dividend payout. Other relevant variables are included in X,
the most important of which is perhaps the age of the subsidiary. Some theoretical literature
(such as Newlon (1987) and Sinn (1990)) suggests that older subsidiaries should have higher
dividend payout ratios. This prediction is a direct consequence of the value of deferral when
12there isa repatriation tax, i.e., if there is deferral, then dividend payouts will on avenge be an
increasing functionofage, other things constant.
As noted already, by using the current tax price, P, the above model may confound the
potentially different effects of permanent and transitory components of the tax price. It is
beyondthe scopeof this paper to derive a theoretical model that explicitly incorporates
intertemporal variation in repatriation tax prices. Instead, we use a reduced form empirical
model to test the general implications that could be àxpected from any such model. In
particular, a transitory decrease (increase) in the tax price reduces the current tax price relative
to future tax prices, and thus enables the firm to increase the value of its foreign source income
by accelerating (delaying) dividend repatriations. But a permanent change in the tax price does
not change the relative prices of current and future repatriation. Therefore, one would expect
dividend repatriations to be affected more by transitory than by permanent changes in tax prices.
And Hartman's (1985) work would indicate that permanent changes in tax prices should have
no effect at all on dividend repatriations.
Based on these considerations, our empirical model generalizes equation (6) to allow for
differences in transitory and permanent tax price effects:
d=a0+a1(P-fl+a2V+br+XA+e, (7)
where P. is the permanent component of the tax price and hence (P-PD is the transitory
component. We estimate this in a slightly different form:
d=ao+aiP+(arajY+br+XA+€. (8)
13One difficultyin estimating equation (8) is that the permanent component of the tax price,
Y, is unobservable. To capture the effect of V we use an instrumentalvariablesapproach in
which we instrument the tax price on a variable, F1, that we expect to be correlated with the
permanent component of the tax price but unconelated with its transitory component. This
essentially involves replacing V in equation (8) with its predicted value,
wherethecoefficients are derived from the regression
P'=b0+b1P'+b2r+XB+E.
We experiment withtwo alternative instruments for the permanent component of the tax price,
the country average tax price and thecountrystatutory withholding tax rate. These instruments
reflect cross-country variation in taxes that should also bereflectedin the permanent component
of thetaxprice butnotin thepurelytransitory component.
For estimation of (8), we use a Tobit procedure because dividend payments are censored
at zero. On the surface, this may appear unnecessary since actual dividend payments are, by
definition, non-negative. However, the desired level of dividend payments could be negative.
This result would obtain if, as suggested by the theoretical work in thisarea, foreign retained
earnings were the preferred source of finance for foreign investment but foreign investment
exceeded foreign earnings. Our use of a Tobit procedure implicitly assumes that we have
modelled desired dividends, but only observe actual dividends.
14IV.The Data
Ourdatasetcontainsinformation from three sets of tax andinformationforms filedby
alarge sample of non-financial U.S. multinational corporations. Subsidiary data are obtained
from information returns, called 5471 forms, filed for each foreign subsidiary of a U.S.
taxpayer. The form 5471 includes balance sheet and income statement variables along with
detailed information on remittances to U.S.parentcorporations. For the purposes of this study,
we needed to append information on the taxable income and foreign tax credit position of parent
corporations to the subsidiary specific data from the form 547 is. We obtained income data from
corporate income tax returns filed by the U.S.parentcorporations. We calculated foreign tax
credit positions using data from the forms filed in support of foreign tax credit claims. Detailed
data from foreign tax credit forms and data from 5471 forms is only compiled in even years and
were available to us only for the years 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986.
Calculating subsidiary-specific tax prices for dividend remittances for each sample year
also requires knowledge of the host country withholding tax rates; the appropriate foreign
corporate tax rates, and details of host country tax systems. To develop a list of country specific
withholding tax rates for each sample year, we used the Price Waterhouse guides and tax
treaties. These guides also provided the appropriate statutory tax rates for the countries in our
sample with non-classical (for example, split rate and imputation) corporate tax systems.
Finally, in each year of the sample we used the subsidiary's avenge foreign tax rate to measure
the corporate tax rate r at which dividends are grossed-up and foreign tax credits are calculated.
15To calculate this rate we divided foreign tax payments by before-tax earnings and profits, both
obtainedfrom the 5471 form data.
Insomesituations,calculating avenge tax rates in this manner may lead toan
unsatisfactoryapproximation of r1.Inparticular, problems arise when subsidiaries report
negative earnings and profits, receive tax refunds from host countries, repatriate dividends in
excessof currentearnings and profits,andreceive dividends from subsidiariesof theirown.
Where feasible,adjustments were madein these cases toarrive at a moresatisfactory measure
ofr.'2 Variousscreens werealsoapplied to the datatoeliminate observationsfor whichthe
datawere suspect.Afterthesedeductionsthetotalnumberof observationsinthesamplewas
22,906.
Some of the estimationrequired linkingsubsidiaries in twoconsecutive sampleyears to
form a panel.This was done largely throughanalgorithmthatmatched subsidiariesbasedon
theirU.S. parent corporation, company name, date of incorporation and country of residence.
Many subsidiaries could not be matched on this basis and they therefore could not be included
in the panel. The total number of observations in the panel was 7,118.
Table 1 presents for each country represented in the sample the mean tax price, the
standard deviation of the tax price, the statutory withholding tax rate and the mean dividend asset
ratio for the subsidiaries located in that country for 1984. This table provides information that
may be valuable in evaluating the usefulness of country mean tax prices and statutory
16withholding tax rates as instruments for the permanent component of the tax price. First note
that thereis substantiai variation in countrymean tax prices and instatutory withholding tax
rates.Mean country tax prices range from -0.21 for Germany to 0.38 for Greece. Statutory
withholding tax rates range from zero for a number of tax haven countries to 55 percent for
Mexico. This degree of variation across countries means that these variables may be useful
instruments, since the cross-country variation ispresumablycorrelated withvariation inthe
permanent component of the tax price.
Note also that within each country the standard deviation of the tax price is relatively
large, in no case less than 0.14. This demonstrates that there is a substantial portion of variation
in tax prices not explainedbydifferences in country statutory dividend withholding and corporate
income tax rates. Finally, note that no clear relationship between country mean dividend payout
ratios and country mean tax prices or statutory withholding rates emerges from inspection of
Table 1. This presages the results presented in the next section.
V.Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results. Column 1 of the table presents the results of
estimating the simple dividend model presented in equation (6) that incorporates only the cunent
tax price of repatriation. These estimates use the full sample of 22,906 observations. They are
presented to check that the results with our sample are essentially the same as found by Hines
and Hubbard and Altshuler and Newlon.
17The results presented in column (1)areindeed similar to thosefound in previous work.
Thecoefficient on the tax price is negative and statistically significant and of similar magnitude
tothe estimates in previous papers. To gauge the economic significance of this coefficient, note
that it implies that a reduction in tax price of one standard deviation (0.34) implies an increase
in the overall dividend payout ratio (including those that pay dividends and those that do not)
of about 0.004, which is equal to about 11 percent of the mean dividend payout ratio of 0.036.
Thus, moving the tax price from one standard deviation above the mean to one standard
deviation below the mean implies an increase in the dividend payout ratio equal to about 22
percentofthe mean dividend payout ratio.
The coefficient on the after-tax rate of return is positive, significant and less than one.
This is plausible, since it implies that an increase in earnings increases dividend payments.
Because it is significantly less than 1, the coefficient also suggests that an increase in the after-
tax rate of return increases retained earnings. Also as expected, the coefficient on subsidiary
age is positive and significant.
Column (2) and the remaining columns of the table present the results of estimating the
model in equation (8) that distinguishes between permanent and transitory tax price effects. To
interpret the tax price coefficient estimates in these columns recall that in equation (8) the effect
of the transitory component of the tax price is captured by the coefficient on the current tax
price, while the coefficient on the permanent tax price equals the difference between the
permanent and transitory tax price effects. Thus, the coefficient estimates in the first row of the
18table represent transitory tax price effects, the second row coefficient estimates represent the
difference between the permanent and transitory tax price effects, and the coefficient estimates
in the third row, which are sumsofthe coefficients in the first two rows, represent permanent
tax price effects.
Column (2) of Table 2 shows estimates, using the full sample, of the basic model in
which the country mean tax price is used as an instrument for the permanent component of the
tax price. The estimated effect of the transitory component of the tax price (in the first row)
is negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, it is larger in absolute magnitude than the
estimated effect from the model excluding the permanent tax price effect.'3 This result implies
that transitory variation in the tax price has a large effect on the incentive to repatriate income.
The estimated difference between the permanent and transitory tax price effects presented
in the second row of column (2) is positive and statistically significant. This implies that the
permanent component of the tax price is not only significantly different from the transitory tax
price effect, but, since the coefficient is positive, cannot have as large a negative impact on
dividend repatriations. In fact, the estimated permanent tax price effect presented in the third
row is not significantly different from zero. These results provide support for the hypothesis
that the dividend repatriation incentive is affected by transitory but not permanent changes in the
tax price of repatriation, a result that is consistent with Hartman's analysis.
19One potential problem with the results from the basic model in column (2) arises because
the tax incentiveto retain earningsabroad should depend on the expected foreign after-tax rate
of return, but we use the actual rate for the current year in our estimates. This may bias the
coefficient on the after-tax rate of return toward zero. More importantly, the difference between
the current and expected after-tax rates of return will be part of the error term. Consequently,
the current tax price and the country mean tax price will both be correlated with the error term
because both depend on current foreign taxes and income. This may bias the coefficients on the
current and permanent tax prices.
To explore whether this is a significant problem we used the two year lead after-tax rate
of return as an instrument for the expected after-tax rate of return. The motivation for this
approach is that, under rational expectations, the difference between the future actual and
expected after-lax rates of return (the forecast error) should be independent of the current after-
tax rate of return, which reflects only current information.
This approach reduces the sample size in two ways. First, use of the two-year lead
means that only the first three years of the data can be used. Second, only observations for
which matches could be found in the following year of the sample could be used. As mentioned
above, these restrictions reduced the sample size to 7,118.
There is some risk that the selection of subsidiaries dropped from the sample by these
requirements was not random. For example, current income repatriation might depend on
20whether there are plans to sell a subsidiary in the future, and subsidiaries sold within two years
would be excluded from the sample. Subsidiaries that are being shut down might also be more
or less likely to pay dividends, and a subsidiary shut down within two years would be excluded
from the sample. If for these or other reasons the selection was significantly non-random,
selection bias mightbe induced.
To investigate whether there is any potential selection bias, column (3) of the table
presents the results of estimating the basic model of column (2) using the restricted sample.
Note that a higher percentage of the subsidiaries in the restricted sample pay dividends to their
U.S.parentcorporation. This isconsistent,for example, with dividend payments being lower
before a subsidiary is soldorshut down. But note that based on Hausman tests on the individual
coefficients of interest the regression results do not differ significantly from those obtained using
the full sample. Thus, there are no signs of selection bias in the restricted sample.
Column (4) of the table presents the results of the regression using the two-year lead
alter-tax rate of return as an instrument for the expected after-tax rate of return. The coefficient
on the after-tax rate of return increases, and the difference is significant based on a Hausman
test. This coefficient implies that a higher expected after-tax rate of return is associated with
greater retention of earnings, but not by as much as measured in the previous regressions. The
tax price coefficients are not significantly different from those in column (2)." These results
therefore provide no evidence that the permanent tax price coefficients are biased by using the
current instead of the expected future foreign after-tax rate of return.
21A second potential problem arisesbecauseeven after controlling for differencesin
countryaverage tax prices and the other regression variables using the instrumental variables
approach the current tax price may still be correlated with the permanent tax price. This is
because the permanent tax price may depend not only on cross-country differences in taxes, but
also on the portfolio of subsidiaries held by the U.S.parentcorporation, on the parent's U.S.
operations,and onexpectationsabout the future. This problem also could bias the tax price
coefficients.Itwould tend to bias the transitory tax price coefficient toward the permanent tax
price coefficient and bias the permanent tax price coefficient (i.e., the estimated difference
betweenthe permanent and transitory tax price effects) toward zero.
To determine whether this is a serious problem we estimated the model using the change
in tax price between the current year and the two-year lead as an instrument for the transitory
tax price. This approach was adopted because the change in the tax price is likely to be less
correlated than the current tax price with the permanent tax price. The results of this estimation
are presented in column (5) of the table. There is no significant change in any of the
coefficients, they are simply estimated with somewhat less precision. Thus, there is no evidence
that the tax price coefficients are biased from a correlation between the current and permanent
tax prices.
A third problem may exist because much of the variation in the country mean tax price
comes from variations in effective corporate tax rates across countries, but variations in foreign
effective corporate tax rates may also affect foreign after-tax rates of return. As a result it may
22be difficult to separately identify the effects of variations in foreign effective tax rates as they
affect repatriation through theireffecton the tax price of repatriation and as they affect
repatriation through their effects on the foreign after-tax rate of return. For example, a higher
foreign corporate tax rate will decrease the tax price of repatriation for the subsidiary of a U.S.
corporation that is in excess limitation, but it will also, ceterisparibus, decreasethe foreign
after-tax rate of return, thereby decreasing the incentive to defer repatriation of foreign income.
Although the models we estimate attempt to avoid this problem by controlling separately for the
foreign after-tax rate of return, the measure we use is imperfect and hence there is some
possibility of misspecification biasing the tax price results.
Our first approach to testing whether this is a significant problem is to use the country
statutory dividend withholding tax rate in place of the country mean tax price as an instrument
for the permanent component of the tax price. The statutory withholding tax rate is related to
the tax price, but has no direct relation to the corporate tax rate. Column (6) of the table
presents the results of this estimation, using the full sample again. Note that the permanent tax
price coefficient changes very little from the basic model estimate in column (2). The difference
is not statistically significant based on a Hausman test. This provides some evidence that there
is no serious misspecification problem.
The approach used to generate the results presented in column (6) may not provide a
conclusive fix for the potential problem, because country statutory withholding tax rates are
correlated with country corporate tax rates. To address this additional possible difficulty we
23remove the correlation from the withholding rate instrument. To do this we regress the
withholdingrate on the countrymean average corporate tax rate and the country statutory tax
rate and use the residual fromthisregressionasan instrumentforthe permanent component of
the tax price. In other words,weuse as an instrumentthepart of thewithholdingtax rate that
is orthogonal to the country mean tax rate and thestatutorycorporate tax rate. The results of
this procedure are presented in column (7) of the table. Here again the coefficient on the
permanent component of the tax price is not significantly different, based on a Hausman test,
from the coefficient obtained in the estimates of the basic model presented in column (2).
VI.Conclusion
The tax price effects on dividend repatriations found in previous studies using the simple
modelof dividendrepatriations apparently measure largely the effect of the timing of dividend
repatriationsto takeadvantage ofintertemporalvariation intaxprices.These timing
opportunities may arise either endogenously,through taxplanningthat affectsboth tax prices
and dividend payments, or throughexogenously causedvariationsintax prices. Therefore,
althoughrepatriationtaxes seem to affect dividend repatriation behavior, this isapparentlyonly
becausetax prices vary ovatime.This resultis consistentwith thepredictionofHartnian's
model.
The results presented here should not be construed to imply that the permanent' levels
of host and home country taxation do not affect dividend repatriation by foreign subsidiaries.
Host and home country corporate taxation will of course affect the earnings reinvestment
24decision, andhencethe dividend repatriation decision, through their impacts on host and home
country after-tax rates of return. The evidence from our estimates merely implies that host and
home country taxation do not affect repatriation through the permanent component of the
repatriation tax.
Our results may have policy implications. The most obvious implications relate to
policies on dividend withholding tax rates. For example, many capital-importing countries
consider lowering withholding taxes, either unilaterally or in the context of bilateral tax treaty
negotiations, to try to attract new equity investment. But some countries may be inhibited by
the fear that such a measure would lead to increased flight of the accumulated multinational
equity trapped" by existing high withholding taxes. Our results suggest that, as long as the
reduction in the withholding tax rate is viewed as permanent, such fears are unfounded.
Permanent changes in dividend withholding tax rates appear likely mainly to attract new equity
investment and not to encourage repatriation of equity accumulated from past earnings.'3
To the extent that these results support the Hartman model, they have implications
regarding the incentive effects of the credit and deferral system that the United States uses to tax
most foreign income of U.S.multinationals.In particular, if the repatriation tax is irrelevant
for the dividend repatriation decision, then, at least as regards retained earnings, the incentives
for foreign investment are the same as they would be under a system that exempts foreign
income from taxation.
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27ENDNOTES
1. See King (1977), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981).
2.The term "normal" is used here to imply that there is some permanent, or long-run
average, repatriation tax cost that the multinationalfaces.By "normal" tax cost we really mean
expected future tax cost.
3. The SubpartF provisionsof the tax code provide for accrual basis taxation on certain
foreign income.
4. Note that this result does not imply that home and host country taxes have no effect on
the repatriation decision. They do have an impact due to their effect on home and host country
after-tax rates of return, but not through the tax on repatriation.
5. Therhythm method was a more useful tax planning device for U.S. multinationals prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, when the foreign tax credit was calculated year by year. The
1986 Act switched to a system in which the foreign tax credit is calculated based on the pool of
previously unremitted foreign earnings and uncredited taxes, and, therefore, shifting the year in
which tax credits and deductions are taken has much less effect on the foreign tax rate for U.S.
foreign tax credit purposes.
6. Although we focus on dividend payments, income may be remitted to parent companies
in the form of interest, rents and royalty payments. Previous work by Altshuler and Newton
(1993) suggests that dividend payments are the most important channel for income remittances,
making up over 60 percent of the total foreign income derived by U.S. parents from their
foreign subsidiaries in 1986.
287. As mentioned above,for taxyears beginning in 1987,theamountofforeigntaxcredit
associated with a dividend payment is based on the accumulated value of earnings and profits.
Althoughthis changes the gross-up formula in the text,itis not relevantforour analysis since
ourdata is takenfrom years priorto 1986.
8. Congress has restricted cross-creditingbycreating baskasof different types offoreign
incometo each of which a separate foreign tax credit limitation applies.Beforethe 1986 Act,
the period which our study covers, there were five separate baskets: (1) one for investment
interest income, (2) one for Domestic International Sales Corporation dividend income, (3) one
for the foreign trade income of a Foreign Sales Corporation, (4) another for distributions from
a Foreign Sales Corporation, and (5)onefor all other foreign source income, which we will call
general limitation income. The 1986 Act decreased the potential for cross-crediting further by
increasing the number of separate limitation baskets to nine.
9. For simplicity we focus our discussion in this section on the derivation of the tax price
of a dividend remittance from a foreign subsidiary operating in a country that uses a classical
corporate tax system. In our empirical work we also take details of host country tax systems
into account since our sample includes subsidiaries that operate in countries with split-rate and
imputation systems. The derivation of the tax prices for these types of tax systems are discussed
in detail in Altshuler and Newton (1993).
10.We neglect here the cases in which the parent corporation has tax losses, since, as in
earlier papers by Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993), we include in
our sample only those U.S. corporations with positive worldwide taxable income. They are
excluded here for simplicity's sake, since the carryover rules for tax losses and foreign tax
29credits can interact in ways that may complicate the incentives for income repatriation of these
firms.
11.Altshuler and Newton (1993) also use a measure of the "expected" tax price that attempts
to take into accountthe factthat excessforeign tax creditscan be carried back to several prior
yearsorforward to several future years to offset taxes in those years.
12.See Altshuler and Newlon (1993) for a description of the methodology.
13.A Hausman test shows that this difference is statistically significant.
14.The coefficient on the current tax price is just barely significantly different (T=2.O), but
the significance is probably overstated since we have not aIjusted the standard errors yet to
account for instrumental variables estimation.
15.If a reduction in withholding tax rates is perceived by multinational investors as a signal





Country I assets taxpricetax pricetax rate
W.Germany 3.9% —oil 038 15%
Japan' 2.7% —0.15 0.48 10
Norway' 1.6% —0.11 0.19 15
U.Kingdom 22% —0.10 0.38 5
Austria 4.2% 0.02 0.41 6
Sweden 0.7% 0.03 0.34 5
France 22% 0.03 0.34 5
Finland 42% 0.03 0.47 5
Italy 2.4% 0.07 0.26 6
Denmark 1.8% 0.07 0.22 6
Luxembourg 1.0% 0.08 0.49 6
Malaysia 2.6% 0.08 0.29 0
Peru 3.4% 0.08 0.79 40
Canada 3.7% 0.08 0.26 5
Belgium 2.3% 0.13 0.35 15
Singapore 5.1% 0.13 029 0
Costa Rica 4.8% 0.13 0.37 15
Netherlands 2.7% 0.14 020 5
New Zealand 2.3% 0.14 0.22 15
Colombia 4.9% 0.15 023 20
Australia 2.2% 0.16 0.24 15
SouthAfrica 3.9% 0.16 0.20 15
Guatemala 3.9% 0.17 0.27 13
Thailand 4.7% 0.13 0.13 20
Brazil 4.0% 0.19 0.51 25
Neth. Antilles 1.0% 0.19 0.23 0
Bahamas 3.4% 0.19 0.25 0
Ireland 3.6% 0.20 0.25 0
Portugal 0.9% 0.20 0.22 25
HongKong 4.9% 0.21 0.21 0
Philippines 1.7% 0.22 0.14 20
Bermuda 3.5% 0.23 023 0
Spain 1.9% 0.23 0.14 18
Venezuela 2.0% 0.24 0.18 20
Cayman Is. 2.8% 024 023 0
Me,dco 2.6% 0.25 0.43 55
Chile 5.1% 025 0.20 30
Argentina 2.8% 0.25 0.29 18
Panama 4.6% 026 0.23 10
Taiwan 3.4% 0.27 0.35 35
Liberia 1.2% 0.28 0.15 15
Greece' 0% 038 028 47
All subsidiaries 2.9% 0.03 0.34 11
Non—classical countriesTable 2: Tobit Model Estimation Results
(dependent variable: subsidiary dividends over assets; standard errors in parentheses)
Partial sample matched
RHS variables, Full sample with 2—year leads Full sample
estimation details (1) I(2) (3) I(4)I(5) (6) I(7)
Current (global)—0.046 —0.059 —0.066 —0.078 —0.070 —0.047 —0.049
tax price (tp) (.0057)(.0062)(.0109) (.0114)(.020)(.0057)(.0058)
Permanent ... 0.0870.0920.0890.0800.080 0.13
tax pricea (.016)(.0263)(.0265)(.031)(.076)(.038)
Sum of tax price ... 0.0270.0270.0100.0100.0330.078
coefficient? (.015)(.024)(.024)(.024)(.076)(.038)
Subsidiary 0.58 0.55 0.49 0.80 0.80 0.55 0.53
earnings / assets(.016)(.016)(.027)(.055)(.055)(.032)(.021)
Subsidiary 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.39
age/ 100 (.017)(.017)(.028)(.028)(.028)(.022)(.018)
Permanent IV
(1) country mean tp x x x x
(2) withholding rate xt
Income IV
2—year forward x x
Transitory IV
2—year change in tp x
Intercept (1980) —0.29—0.29—0.24—0.28—0.28—0.26—0.29
(.0059) (.0060) (.0093)(.012)(.012) (.0051) (.0064)
1982 Dummy 0.0260.0260.0380.0390.0390.0300.026
(.0051)(.0051)(.0071) (.0073)(.0073)(.0054) (.0051)
1984 Dummy —0.029 —0.030 —0.0037 0.00075 0.00098 —0.030 —0.031
(.0053)(.0053) (.0085)(.0088)(.0088)(.0053)(.0054)
1986 Dummy —0.012 —0.012...... ... —0.012—0.013
(.0065) (.0065) (.0066)(.0066)
Observations 22,906 22,9067,1187,1187,11822,90622,906
Payingdividends 28% 28% 37% 37% 37% 28% 28%
Notes:
a Measures the difference between effects ofchanges in permanent and transitory lax prices.
(transitory tax pricecurrent tax price — permanent tax price)
b Measurestheeffect of permanentlaxpricechanges,holdingthetransitorytaxprice arnstant.
c Usespartotwithholding rate orthogonal to the foreign statutory and anantry mean average tax rates.